

## PHILOSOPHICAL CULTURE IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING COUNTRIES

**Shigabutdinova Dina Yasavievna,**

Bukhara State University,

Lecturer, Independent Researcher, Faculty of Foreign Languages( ESP) Natural Sciences  
department

Mailbox:diasavievna@gmail.com

Phone:+998974886515

<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2718-0510>

**Safatova Nigora Olimovna**

Navoyi State Pedagogical Institute

Scientific Supervisor, Professor of the Department of Philosophical Sciences

safarovanigora23@gmail.com

### ABSTRACT

The history of philosophical culture of English-speaking countries has a long history. Over the centuries, this process has improved. Philosophy generates an infinite variety of forms and approaches both within its discourse and outside. Not only different directions in philosophy, but also different cultures, different countries philosophize differently. In this regard, in the second half of the twentieth century, there was a need for a positive interpretation of this diversity, and even a new explanation of the very essence of philosophy, taking into account the fundamental role of this factor. The author proposes to make the concept of "philosophical culture" the key concept of this article.

**Keywords:** history of philosophy, sociology philosophy, philosophical culture

### INTRODUCTION

Of course, it is not news that both philosophy itself and the forms of philosophizing (that is, the ways in which philosophical thought is carried out) in different parts of the world take on a very dissimilar appearance. "Philosophers," as AbbéGaliani wrote (with obvious dislike of the situation in his hometown), "grow up in Paris in the open air, in Berlin and St. Petersburg in greenhouses, and in Naples on a dunghill."<sup>1</sup> After the 18th century, the variety of different forms of philosophizing only increased, although the process of globalization brought with it the opposite trend, in the form of a clear favoring of the economic and political hegemony of the Anglo-speaking countries to those philosophical approaches that traditionally prevailed in Anglo-Saxon culture.

One way or another, a more or less systematic search for explanations for this phenomenon began relatively recently, and the first attempts to thematize this problem in the social sciences date back almost yesterday. At the latest with the publication of Randall Collins's voluminous *Sociology of Philosophies* (1998)<sup>2</sup>, it became possible to speak of the sociology of philosophy as an established article. The prestigious Swedish yearbook *Lychnos*, devoted to the history of ideas, soon took note of the new trend and made the sociology of philosophy a sub-topic of its 2006 issue. In the preface to it, Karl-GoranHeidegren and Henrik Lundberg trace the roots of the sociology of philosophy as an independent field of study to Wilhelm Wundt, but all other authors they mention are much more modern: along with Pierre Bourdieu (Martin Heidegger's *Political Ontology*, 1975). ) as the founders of the new discipline, they credit such scientists as Martin Kusch (*Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*, 2000) and Klaus Koenke (*The Birth and Rise of Neo-Kantianism*, 1986). I would add Heidegren's work on the modernist shift in Nordic university philosophy and Lundberg's 2007 dissertation to the list.<sup>3</sup> Thus, the sociology of philosophy is a relatively new science, the formation of which we can observe with our own eyes right here and now.<sup>4</sup>

According to Heidegren and Lundberg, the sociology of philosophy should be understood as a science that "does not try to replace other ways in which it is customary today to write the history of philosophy." This is the sociology of a certain area, like, say, the sociology of sciences and scientificity; the field of study in this case is "philosophical activity, as it is rooted in various historical and cultural contexts and organized in various social

<sup>1</sup> CarlJusti, *Winckelmann und seine Zeitgenossen*, Köln:Phaidon Verlag 1956, Bd.II, p.205.

<sup>2</sup> Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies. A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, Cambridge,Mass./London:BelknapPress/HarvardUniv.Press 1998, paperback edition 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Carl-GöranHeidegren, *Det modernagenombrottet inordiskuniversitetsfilosofi 1860—1915*, Göteborg 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Henrik Lundberg, *Filosofisociologi. Ett sociologiskt perspektiv på filosofiskttänkande*, Lund 2007 (LundDissertationinSociology, 78).

forms, as well as the production of philosophical knowledge".<sup>5</sup> Where Collins insists that the sociology of philosophy is "not a form of philosophy at all" but "just another kind of empirical sociology,"<sup>6</sup> Heidegren and Lundberg counter him by emphasizing that today's sociology of philosophy is different from the "sociology of knowledge" à la Mannheim, which still applies traditional sociological methods. Older disciplines in this field saw thought as nothing more than "an exponent of social belonging," while the new sociology of philosophy, seeking to avoid the reductionism of earlier approaches, seeks links between social belonging and thought. An example of such a link is the concept of a special "field of philosophy" introduced by P. Bourdieu. It is there that the formation of philosophy takes place, and Bourdieu is thus able to "avoid the position according to which thinking is the expression of some whole thought, of a bourgeois or socialist persuasion".<sup>7</sup>

The emergence of a new article actualizes, in addition to everything else, the old question about the nature of the subject of research itself, i.e. philosophy. What, in essence, is the intellectual formation observed by the sociologists of philosophy? Most of them seem to treat philosophy as something given, in the same way that the sociology of science, without making a big deal out of it, views science as a sum of institutions and accumulated knowledge, or as the sociology of the family is based on the mere givenness of the family. and marriage as social institutions. Thus, for example, Randall Collins, with the help of his sociology of philosophy, wants to analyze primarily "the dynamics of conflicts and alliances in intellectual networks"; he does not give a more precise definition of what philosophy should be.<sup>8</sup>

Here we run into the boundaries of a new article. To outline them more clearly, let me turn to previous discussions about the essence and nature of philosophy. I think that I can best illustrate my position with an example from Russian - or rather, Soviet - discourses. As you probably know, the Soviet philosopher Theodor Oizerman had a project for a scientific theory of philosophy, which, especially considering the circumstances in which Soviet scientists had to work, was quite original in the good sense of the word. He called this project "historical and philosophical science", which I will abbreviate further in the text as IFN. Oizerman's project was clearly and very strongly influenced by the history of Hegel's philosophy, most of all by his ambitious plan to cover the branching philosophical streams within the framework of a single organic and synthetic scheme, instead of a banal statement of their presence. The main difference between Oizerman and Hegel was that, as the result of two and a half thousand years of development of philosophy, he put not the "absolute idea", but Marxism. The originality of Oizerman's concept even aroused a certain interest in the West, for example, Evert van der Zweerde devoted a monograph to it.<sup>9</sup>

## MAIN PART

### Philosophical culture of the 17 th century in English-speaking countries

The 17th century in Western Europe is characterized by the intensive development of bourgeois relations in society. The needs of capitalist production have radically changed people's attitude to science, to the goals and significance of human knowledge. If during the Middle Ages the main efforts of human minds were aimed at substantiating the existence of God and proving the greatness of his creation, then in the age of emerging capitalist production, science and its tool - the mind - are considered as useful tools for creating and transforming the world.

The founder of the new approach to science is the famous English politician and philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Bacon gave a philosophical justification for a new view of the purpose and purpose of science, developed the basic principles of the inductive method of research. Bacon's aphorism "Knowledge is power" has been a symbol of science for three centuries.

Science, according to Bacon, cannot serve only the purposes of the justification of God, and also be knowledge for the sake of knowledge. The ultimate goal of science is invention and discovery. The goal of inventions and discoveries is human benefit: meeting the needs and improving people's lives, increasing the potential of its energy, increasing the power of man over nature. But science, according to Bacon, in its modern form is not capable of solving positive problems, it is necessary to rebuild the building of science. For this, in his opinion, two types of work should be done: critical and positive.

The critical, destructive part of Bacon's philosophical system is aimed at identifying the causes of human delusions and at developing recommendations for overcoming them. Two main directions can be distinguished here: the doctrine of idols or ghosts and criticism of the scholastic method of knowledge.

Bacon considered the clogging of people's consciousness with the so-called idols, distorted images of reality, false ideas and concepts, as the main obstacle to the knowledge of nature. He distinguished four types of idols with

---

<sup>5</sup> Carl-Göran Heidegren, Henrik Lundberg, "Sanning på en sidan av Pyrenéerna, villfarelse på den andra". *Om kunskaps sociologi, filosofisociologi och filosofihistoria*, in: LYCHNOS – Årsbok för idé- och lärdoms historia, Uppsala 2006, pp. 149, 150.

<sup>6</sup> Randall Collins, *For a Sociological Philosophy*, in: *Theory and Society* 17 (1988), S, 670; citation here according to Heidegren & Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 162

<sup>7</sup> Heidegren & Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

<sup>8</sup> Randall Collins, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

<sup>9</sup> Evert van der Zweerde, *Soviet Historiography of Philosophy: Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 1997.

which mankind should fight: 1) idols of the family; 2) idols of the cave; 3) idols of the market; 4) idols of the theater.

Bacon considered the idols of the kind to be false ideas about the world that are inherent in the entire human race and are the result of the limitations of the human mind and senses. This limitation is most often manifested in the anthropomorphization of things, that is, endowing natural phenomena with human characteristics, mixing one's own human nature with the natural nature. In order to reduce the harm caused to the knowledge of the idols of the family, people need to compare the readings of the senses with the objects of the surrounding world and thereby verify their correctness.

Bacon called the idols of the cave distorted ideas about reality associated with the subjectivity of the perception of the surrounding world. Each person, according to Bacon, has his own cave, his own subjective inner world, which leaves an imprint on all his judgments about things and processes of reality. The inability of a person to go beyond his subjectivity is the cause of this type of delusion.

To the idols of the market or the square, Bacon refers to the false ideas of people generated by the misuse of words. People often put different meanings into the same words, and this leads to empty, fruitless disputes over words, a passion for word disputes, which, ultimately, distracts people from studying natural phenomena and understanding them correctly. Bacon calls them idols of the market or square because in medieval cities and in Bacon's time, scholastic verbiage about such problems as, for example, how many devils can fit on the end of a needle, took place in crowded places - markets and squares.

In this regard, an important place in Bacon's philosophical system is occupied by criticism of the scholastic philosophy that prevailed in the Middle Ages, which he considered the main obstacle to the study of nature. Bacon said that scholastic philosophy is fruitful in words, but fruitless in deeds and has given the world nothing but disputes and bickering. Bacon saw the fundamental defect of scholasticism in its abstractness, expressed, in his opinion, in the concentration of all mental activity on syllogisms, on the derivation of the corresponding particular consequences from general provisions. Bacon argued that using only syllogisms, it is impossible to achieve true knowledge of things and the laws of nature. Bacon opposed the scholastic theory of syllogism, as the main form of knowledge, with the inductive method (the features of which we will consider a little later).

In order to tear philosophy away from fruitless theological disputes and give philosophy the opportunity for independent development, Bacon put forward the theory of dual truth. In this theory, he made a strict distinction between the subject, functions and methods of knowledge in theology and philosophy. Theology is the study of God - God-knowledge. Its function is to substantiate and protect religious dogma. The subject of philosophy is nature; the goal of philosophy is the study of the laws of nature, the development of a method of knowing nature. Therefore, their methods are different: theology relies on supernatural revelation - the authority of the Holy Scriptures and the Church, and philosophy - on the coincidence of thought with reality, on truth.

#### **Bacon's doctrine of the method of empiricism and the basic rules of the inductive method**

The central part of Bacon's philosophy is the doctrine of method. The method for Bacon has a deep practical and social significance. It is the greatest transforming force, since it correctly orients the theoretical and practical activity of a person, and maximizes its effectiveness. Pointing out the shortest path to knowledge, to new discoveries and inventions, the method increases man's power over the forces of nature, promotes human happiness.

Bacon was the founder of English empiricism. His method was based on the recognition of the leading role in the knowledge of experience. Cognition, according to Bacon, is nothing but the image of the external world in the human mind. It begins with sensory knowledge, with perceptions of the external world, but the latter, in turn, need experimental verification, confirmation and addition. "We do not attach much importance to the direct perception of feeling in itself, he wrote, but we are working to ensure that feeling judges only about experience, and experience about the object itself" "The best evidence is experience if it is rooted in experiment" he continues the same thought.

Experiments, according to Bacon, must be carried out according to a certain method. Such a method in Bacon's philosophy is induction. Bacon taught that induction is necessary for the sciences, based on the indications of the senses, the only true form of proof and method of knowing nature. If in deduction the order of movement of thought about the general to the particular, then in induction - from the particular to the general.

The method proposed by Bacon provides for the sequential passage of five stages of the study, each of which is recorded in the corresponding table. Thus, the entire volume of empirical inductive research, according to Bacon, includes five tables. Among them:

- 1). Presence table (listing all occurrences of a phenomenon);
- 2). Table of deviation or absence (all cases of absence of one or another sign, indicator in the presented items are entered here);
- 3). Table of comparison or degrees (comparison of an increase or decrease in a given feature in the same subject);
- 4). Drop table (the exclusion of individual cases that do not occur in this phenomenon is not typical for it);
- 5). Table of "gathering fruits" (forming a conclusion based on what is common in all tables).

Bacon illustrates the effectiveness of the inductive method with the example of heat analysis. But this method is applicable to all empirical scientific research, and since then, specific sciences, primarily sciences based on direct empirical research, have widely used the method developed by F. Bacon.

### **Background and general characteristics of the English philosophical culture of modern times**

Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679), who became a student and continuer of the philosophical tradition of F. Bacon:

- resolutely rejected theological scholastic philosophy;
- he saw the goal of philosophy as the achievement of practical results in human activity, the promotion of scientific and technological progress;
- in a dispute between empiricism (experimental knowledge) and rationalism (knowledge with the help of reason), he took the side of empiricism; criticized the rationalistic philosophy of Descartes;
- was a convinced materialist;
- considered the questions of society and the state to be the most important philosophical problem;
- developed the theory of the state;
- He was the first to put forward the idea that the basis for the emergence of the state was a social (joint) contract.

The main subject of philosophical interests of Hobbes is epistemology (the doctrine of knowledge) and the problem of the state.

T. Hobbes believed that a person realizes knowledge mainly due to sensory perception. Sensory perception is the receipt by the sense organs (eyes, ears, etc.) of signals from the outside world and their subsequent processing. T. Hobbes calls these signals "signs" and gives their subsequent classification:

- signals - sounds made by animals to express their actions or intentions ("singing" of birds, growling of predators, meowing, etc.);
- marks - various signs invented by man for generalization;
- natural signs - "signals" of nature (thunder, lightning, clouds, etc.);
- arbitrary communicative signs - words of various languages;
- signs and roles of "marks" - a special "encoded" speech, understandable to a few (scientific language, the language of religion, jargon, etc.);
- signs of signs - names of names - universals (general concepts).

As a method of cognition, T. Hobbes advocated the simultaneous use of both induction and deduction.

The problem of society and the state, according to Hobbes, is the main one in philosophy, since the goal of philosophy is to help a person achieve practical results in his activities, and a person lives and acts in society and a particular state.

The philosopher became the author of the world-famous book "Leviathan" ("The Monster" - published in 1651 during the period of Cromwell's dictatorship), in which he substantiated the theory of society and the state. The essence of this theory is as follows:

- man has an inherently evil nature;
- the driving force of human actions are personal gain and selfishness, passions, needs, affects;
- these qualities lead to the consciousness of every person of the right to everything;
- the right of each person to everything and disregard for the interests of others leads to a "war of all against all", in which there can be no winner and which makes it impossible for people to live together normally and make economic progress;
- in order to survive together, people have concluded their claims and "the right of all to everything";
- to prevent the "war of all against all", the suppression of extreme egoism, a common institution (mechanism) for regulating life in society - the state arose;
- in order to effectively perform its very difficult functions, the state must become omnipotent;
- the state is an unshakable, many-sided, omnipotent monster - "Leviathan", which "devours and sweeps away everything in its path" - a force that cannot be resisted, but which is necessary to maintain the viability of society, order and justice in it.

John Locke (1632 - 1704) developed many of the philosophical ideas of Bacon and Hobbes, put forward a number of his own theories, and continued the empirical and materialistic tradition of English philosophy of modern times.

The following main provisions of the philosophy of J. Locke can be distinguished:

- the world is materialistic;
- knowledge can be based only on experience ("there is nothing in the thoughts (mind) of a person that was not in the feelings before");
- consciousness - an empty room (empty cabinet), which during life is filled with experience (in this regard, Locke's statement about consciousness as a "blank slate" on which experience is written - tabula rasa is world-famous);
- the source of experience is the external world;
- the purpose of philosophy is to help a person achieve success in his activities;
- the ideal of a person is a calm, law-abiding, respectable gentleman who improves his level of education and achieves good results in his profession;

the ideal of the state is a state built on the basis of the separation of powers into legislative, executive (including the judiciary) and federal (foreign policy). Locke was the first to put forward this idea, and this is his great merit.

#### **Philosophical cultural of the American civilization**

Culturologists and philosophers have long and persistently been trying to build a certain universal model of the typology of cultural development, to offer their own algorithm that could explain the features of a particular culture. Perhaps the most harmonious typology of cultural development was proposed by the American scientist J. Feibleman. He singled out seven types of culture: four "early", isolating preprimitive ("infra-primitive"), primitive ("primitive"), military ("martial"), religious ("religious") and three "developed": civilized ("civilized"), scientific ("scientific") and post-scientific ("ultra-scientific").<sup>10</sup>

Any local civilization forms its own type of culture. Obviously, American civilization also possesses it. The genesis of civilization in the United States dates back to the period of the 17th-18th centuries. The turning point in the history of mankind is well known. Its significance is also exceptional for America as a starting point in shaping the features of its culture. Guided by the scheme proposed by Feibleman, it can be correlated with the transition from "early" types of culture to "developed". Thus, the cultural genesis of the young nation began at the junction of two cultural types - religious and civilized.

J. Feibleman, speaking about the religious type of culture, states that "the main question of religious culture addressed to its bearers is: "How pious are you?". And the ideal is the most God-obedient person. In this type of culture there is both a strict regulation of life and a strong organization. The common goal is the rejection of any significance of earthly life. The main social institution of the religious type of culture is the church. Education is almost entirely relegated to religious purposes. True science is in its infancy, pseudosciences - alchemy, astrology, magic - flourish." This generalized characteristic clearly echoes the specific processes that we observe in America throughout the 17th - first half of the 18th centuries.

It is common knowledge that most of the North American colonies were founded by Protestants (Puritans, Quakers, Congregationalists, etc.). Religious attitude permeated all spheres of life of the first generations of colonists. In their everyday life, as D. Burstin aptly noted, "an organic fusion of a strict religious spirit with an inexhaustible variety of life experience" was constantly carried out.<sup>11</sup> And the very exodus from Europe, the act of "pilgrimage" across the ocean, was perceived by the "Pilgrim Fathers" as the acquisition of the Promised Land - the place where the "City on the Hill" would be erected in the most biblical, Old Testament sense. When the first Puritans arrived in New England, they saw themselves first and foremost as pilgrims, a kind of pilgrimage, and their path was destined from above.

J. Feibleman, describing the civilized type (stage) of culture, writes: "The main question of civilized culture, addressed to its individual representatives, is how individual are your feelings? The individual is required to be unique in his reactions; adequate to this type of culture is a person who is able to develop their own criteria for sensations, feelings, thoughts and actions. Diversity is characteristic of this type of culture. Rationality, understood as one's own way of thinking, is highly valued. This statement largely explains the significance for Americans of such character traits and "purely American" values as individualism, pragmatism, diligence and efficiency.

#### **CONCLUSION**

Why exactly these character traits, precisely these "national" values, formed at the initial stage of national history, were fixed, while others, perhaps more needed at some other stage of evolution that arose later. The answer to this question is obvious. The colonists, scattered immigrants from Europe who became residents of North America, were deprived of common traditions and created them a new in the course of the formation and development of a young nation, which acquired essential features in the process of inevitable ethno-cultural self-identification.

The "civilized" stage not only developed entrepreneurial spirit among Americans, but also instilled in them a relentless interest and unwavering commitment to various technical devices that make life easier. The ability of Americans to create new technologies in a seemingly empty place for some thinkers has become the basis for declaring a new type of human personality that allegedly has developed in America - about a certain American homo faber - a "man-creator". Homo faber (man-creator) is an American and homo sapiens (a man-thinker) is a European, - this is how the famous French sociologist A. Siegfried succinctly defined the difference between American and European civilizations

#### **References**

Collins, Randall, *The Sociology of Philosophies. A Global Theory of Intellectual Change*, Cambridge, Mass./London: Belknap Press/Harvard Univ. Press 1998, paperback edition 2000.

Hegel, G.W.F., *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Westberlin: DEB

---

<sup>10</sup>Feibleman J.K. *The Theory of Human Culture*. N.Y.: Humanitarian Press, 1968. 361p.

<sup>11</sup>Burstin D. *Americans: The Colonial Experience*. M.: Progress-Liter, 1993. 480 p.

1984.

Heidegren, Carl-Göran, *Det moderna genombrottet i nordiska universitetsfilosofi 1860—1915*, Göteborg 2004.

Heidegren, Carl-Göran, Lundberg, Henrik, "Sanning på ensida av Pyrenéerna, villfarelse på den andra". Om kunskapssociologi, filosofisociologi och filosofihistoria, in: LYCHNOS—Årsbok för idé- och lärdoms historia, Uppsala 2006, pp. 149, 150.

Justi, Carl, *Winckelmann und seine*

*Zeitgenossen*, Köln: Phaidon Verlag 1956. Lundberg, Henrik, *Filosofisociologi. Ett sociologiskt perspektiv på filosofisk tänkande*,

Lund 2007 (Lund Dissertations in Sociology, 78).

Oiserman, T. I., *Probleme der Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte*, Berlin: Dietz Verlag 1972.

Oittinen, Vesa, *Evert vander Zwerden haastattelu*, in: *niin & näin—filosofina aikakauslehti*, 1/2008.

Zweerde, Evert vander, *Soviet Historiography of Philosophy: Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka*, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer 1997.

Zweerde, Evert vander, *Soviet Philosophy—the Ideology and the Handmaid*, Diss., Nijmegen 1994.

*History of the USA: In 4 volumes / Under. ed. N.N. Bolkhovitinova and others*. M.: Nauka, 1983. T. 1: 1607–1877. 687 p.

*America: An Encyclopedia of Everyday Life*. M.: Transkniga, 1998. 416 p.

Gadzhiev K.S. *The American Nation: National Identity and Culture*. M.: Nauka, 1990. 240 p.

*Phraseological Units with Colour Designation Component as a Means of Reflecting the Self-Consciousness of the English People*, Yusupov, Oybek and Mirzaeva Iroda and Mukhamedaminov Aziz and Shigabutdinova Dina and Nazarov Sardor and Muradov Utkir, Toshpulatov Temur and Fayziev, Shokhrud and Fayziev, Shakhram, *LINGUISTICA ANTVERPENSIA*, pages={719--731}, year={2021}

Yasavievna, S. D. (2021). *The Concept Of Culture In English Philosophy*. *Journal of Contemporary Issues in Business & Government*, 27(1).